

about the GVN's unaided capabilities, i.e., the GVN without U.S. air support. (This is not in any way offered as an estimate that U.S. air support would not be provided if the Communists mounted an all-out offensive.) Last year's Communist offensive was checked and contained by the GVN operating with U.S. air support. The Communists are now back at about their peak 1972 military capabilities and we are saying they and the GVN (alone) are fairly evenly matched in terms of measurable capabilities. This is not an argument that the GVN is weaker than it was last year. Quite the reverse. Its strength has increased considerably since last year. Again, remember that the force equation addressed in this study is different from last year's force equation because we have subtracted U.S. air power from this net assessment.

4. Because this was a self-initiated project (which I thought you might find useful), it was done entirely within the Agency. To the best of my knowledge we have no significant disagreements with our Defense Department colleagues or other members of the intelligence community on the matters covered in this study, but this is not a coordinated paper. In fact, no one outside the Agency and your office is aware of its existence.

5. In addition to your two copies, I am sending one copy to General Scowcroft and one to Mr. Kennedy. No additional distribution will be made unless or until you direct otherwise.

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Special Assistant for Vietnamese Affairs

Attachment

SC-06971/73, Copies 1 and 2

Copy No. 3 - General Scowcroft

Copy No. 4 - Mr. Kennedy

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ORIGINAL DOCUMENT MISSING PAGE(S):

Attachments 1 & 2 missing